Showing posts with label comparison. Show all posts
Showing posts with label comparison. Show all posts

Thursday, February 24, 2022

How to attain academic novelty in a legal article?

Everybody is striving for novelty in their academic (legal) papers.

The novelty might be linked to actuality, a new phenomenon (facts, decisions, books, etc.) with legal dimensions to be explored. Hence, an academic writer might be at first a (legal) critic of actuality. 
The danger of the approach is that such novelty is a 'fragile commodity' that 'vanishesquickly. Also, such a topic will push different authors to write articles about it. Therefore, the importance of the message (as a distinct voice) will be lost in no time.

A much better strategy would be to search for novelty as a new legal perspective about a phenomenon.
This novelty of approach or insight is not linked to the actuality of the issue (without excluding it either). Instead, it can be reached by choosing a topic on the 'edge', by crossing borders into unexplored 'fields'.
On a deep level, crossing such an edge might imply using analogy or comparison as a heuristic. Such analogy signifies the analysis of deep, structural correspondence between two fields by examining a better-known area's relations (or relation with relations) to another, less-known domain. In cognitive sciences, the approach is called the 'mapping'[4] between the two fields[5].
More precisely, one might use an analogy from a legal field to another legal area. We can give the example of cyber-attacks dealt with by criminal law on a national level. But the problems of cyber security can be analyzed by analogy with similar instruments of International law. One might examine (speculate from an empirical ground) whether a cyberattack can be a cyber war (international law crime) and the conditions for qualified it as such. 

Comparison as a heuristic process
Another productive instrument for creating new topics is legal comparison broadly defined (within the same branches of different legal systems, or among other theories or various doctrines, etc.). By contrast, one might put in parallel components of different legal systems. 
That will automatically create a first questioning since there will be differences between compared entities, besides similarities which make comparison possible. Then, in a second moment, the researcher might examine the reason for such differences. The comparison might also create a dynamic in the paper, which would remain purely descriptive without it.  












[1] Transatlantic answers ..., infra this blog.
[2] Professor Richard Delgado made the suggestion that legal writers should "find one new point, one new insight, one new way of looking at a piece of law and organize your entire article around that. One insight from another discipline [italics are from us], one application of simple logic to a problem where it has never been made before is all you need." Cf. Richard Delgado, How to Write a Law Review Article, 20 USF L. REV. (1986) at 449.
[3] Cyber attacks…, infra this blog.
[4] The structure-mapping theory states that an analogy between analogues A and B is a set of mappings between the two sets of predicates (relations) that represent A and B. A mapping is an alignment of corresponding parts of the source and target analogues. 
Mappings are subject to the following three rules:
1. Mappings between attributes are primarily or entirely ignored;
2. Mappings between relations, e.g., R(a0, a1) to R(b0, b1), which are emphasized where,
3. They enter into systems of relations, e.g., R_(Ra0, Ra1) to R_(Rb0, Rb1). Cf. Gentner, D. (1983), "Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy", Cognitive Science, 7, 155-170.
[5] The most spectacular use of analogies in hard sciences is the case of Kepler, one of the most creative geniuses. 
Apparently, his creativity was linked to 3 factors: frequent use of analogy, different analogues (pairs of metaphors), and attention to inconsistency. Kepler worried about inconsistencies and was driven by them to push old analogies or, sometimes, to reject them. However, apparently, these two factors play different roles. 
Attention to inconsistencies was a motivator of conceptual change. 
In contrast, the analogy was the process through which conceptual change occurred.
Cf. Dedre Gentner et al., "Analogy and creativity in the works of Johannes Kepler", in T . B . Ward, S . M . Smith, J . Vaid (Eds), Creative thought: An investigation of conceptual structures and processes (pp. 403-459). Washington DC, American Psychological Association. Mutatis mutandis can apply the same logic for an analogy between legal domains.

Tuesday, October 27, 2020

Comparison as an interpretative tool of the European Union judge

We live in a world where many legal systems interact continuously. Some of these interactions can be described as ‘legal transplants’ in-between national laws. In this way, sometimes, entire legal structures are borrowed from a foreign country. 
That was the case for the Swiss Code of Obligations, which Turkey has adopted in the 30s. In the beginning, at least, the Turkish judges may have interpreted a concept by examining its meaning in Swiss law, which implied the use of comparison between Turkish and Swiss legal systems.
Another interesting case, this time of ‘synthetic’ transplant, relates to the Civil Code of Ethiopia, designed by great comparative scholar, René David,  who took into account rules or institutions from France, Italy, Greece, Switzerland, Israel, etc. The Ethiopian judge, willing to clarify, an obscure term in the new code may have used multiple comparisons between his own system and each specific disposition's origin.
But such ‘legal transplant’ may also occur between legal systems of a different kind. For example, International Law may borrow concepts and rules from national law. The international legal scholars have played a role in this transposition since they were fed by their national legal culture. 
More recently, in many disputes of highly technical issues, the International Courts or the Arbitrators have resorted to long-established institutions from private national laws and hence use comparison in interpretation.
The most interesting 'laboratory' for such an interpretative use of comparison based on solution from national legal systems is, or more exactly was, European Union (when it was called European Community).
If this brief presentation catches the attention of the reader, he may find a still evolving draft of  about
Comparison as an interpretative tool of the international judge: the European Union case, visible at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648866.
The first part of the paper circumscribes the meaning of comparison as an interpretative tool. A step-by-step approach clarifies the meaning of comparison in general, comparison as interpretation in particular, and realizes an overview of comparative interpretative practice by international tribunals and identifies hidden cases when the European judge employed the comparison.
The second part of the article examines the emergence of comparative interpretation in topic case-laws relating to the European Community of Steel and Carbon (ECSC) Treaty. In the 50s and 60s, there was an unseen dialogue of the doctrine, the Advocates Generals, and the European judge about interpreting the ECSC Treaty's undetermined normative concepts. The outcome of this dialogue was the occurrence of a 'standard' interpretative comparison, a multi-comparison, which was used by the European judge ever since. 
The third part of the article places this 'standard' comparison within a methodological perspective. This perspective offers the ground for 'translating,' methodologically speaking, the 'standard' comparison as a subset of the literal or grammatical interpretation belonging to an objective system of interpretation. The 'standard' comparison is strongly linked to multi-juralism (existence of many independent and parallel legal systems of Member States) and loosely linked to multilingualism (the legal use of multiple languages within EU), both essential characteristics of the European legal system.
This powerful and misunderstood tool of the judge had an essential role in the European Union's historical evolution. It may also provide hints and solutions for national or international cases where legal pluralism is at stake.

Monday, December 23, 2013

Legal vs. linguistical puralism : a misunderstood duality?

We live in a world with many legal systems and languages that interact continuously,  either in space or time.
Regarding the latter, many chronological interactions can be described as ‘legal transplant’ in between national laws. 
In this way, sometimes, entire legal structures are borrowed from a foreign country. 
That was the case for the Swiss Code of Obligations, which Turkey has adopted in the 30s. In the beginning, at least, the Turkish judges may have interpreted a concept by examining its meaning in Swiss law, which implied the use of comparison between Turkish and Swiss legal systems.
Another interesting case, this time of ‘synthetic’ transplant relates to the Civil Code of Ethiopia, which has been designed by great comparative scholar, René David,  who took into account rules or institutions from France, Italy, Greece, Switzerland, Israel, etc. The Ethiopian judge, willing to clarify, an obscure term in the new code may have used multiple comparison between his own system and the origin of each specific disposition.
But such ‘legal transplant’ may also occur between legal systems of a different kind. 
For example International Law may borrow concepts and rules from national law. 
The international legal scholars have played a role in this transposition since they were fed of their national legal culture. 
More recently, in many disputes of highly technical issues, the International Courts or the Arbitrators have resorted to long-established institutions from private national laws.
In the case of conventional International Law it was the language of treaties which seemed to provide the solution. Given the absence of a specific language of International Law, different from States' languages, the international rules were necessarily written ​​in one national language. Through these vehicular languages, the legal concepts and institutions of national laws passed to International Law.
In the last 70 years, the emergence of multilingual treaties has added complexity to the whole process. 
If only one language version of the Treaty's text is authentic (the other versions being just its official translations), the interpreter may use only that official version. Therefore the interpretation of multilingual legal texts was similar to the interpretation of a monolingual text.
More interesting was the second case, where all linguistic versions of a Treaty was equally authentic. In this case, the interpreter might have to use the multilingual systems of interpretation codified in article 33 of The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
The European Union had both situations.
If this brief presentation catches the attention of the reader, he may find a still evolving draft of Multijuralism and interpretative comparison by Judge of International Organizations: European Union case at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2342090.