Podcast of a presentation for "Autonomy of military robots..." made on the last September, in Seoul

The conference, International Symposium on Security and Military Law, with regular sessions during each year, was held in Seoul from September 16 to September 18, 2015.

The audio quality of the recording is far from perfect. However, this is my first try...

For a final version of the article which accompanies the presentation, please refer to http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602160.

Any remarks are more than welcome.

Cyberwar? ... attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence. ~ Sun Tzu, The Art of War

The  war is a violent continuation of interstates politics (according to von Clausewitz). The cyber war should enter the same paradigm.

From a legal perspective the international doctrine examined whether a cyber attack could be qualified as use of force (under article 2.5 of UNO charter) or as an armed attack (under article 51 of UNO charter). The criteria for considering a cyber attack as covered by above notions was the degree of physical destructiveness. A small degree of physical destruction will qualify a cyber attack under non military, international concepts like economic force, reprisals, international responsibility, etc.

This analysis seemed pertinent. It try to see the cyber warfare (form of interstate cyber attack) as an analogical extension of classical warfare. As such the cyber warfare would be another step within an unchanged framework.But the real evolution of cyber attacks by state actors shows the limits of this vision. No state is willing to escalate a cyber attack and produce the huge destruction that may trigger the classical forms of war or armed conflict. They will prefer to act unnoticed but pursuing their political aims with the new tool.

We can figure out even a more challenging. The question of destructiveness seems to be the core issue.  As such the main concept is ‘information (virtual) destructiveness’ that may relate to physical destructiveness in the same way that the 'intellectual property rights' relates to ordinary 'property rights'. Without dead and wounded, without casualties, this concept of ‘virtualized’ (invisible but not least severe) destruction might be an essential aspect of a cyber warfare undermining the base of a knowledge economy,  knowledge society or knowledge state. Finally we get a hint of cyber attacks as a cyber warfare (or cyber war) on itself , as a new genus,  and not as part of classical armed conflict paradigm.

Future of wars, wars of the future...

Predicting the future of war is a challenging but fascinating endeavor. 
The pop culture we are now submerged in has familiarized us with the images of a nutty–gritty mix of weapons, robots, hi-tech knights in a sort of a mega computer game. Shall the war of tomorrow be a purely technological competition in advanced weaponry? My belief is that this colorful image is just a part of the answer.

To foresee the future war as in a “crystal ball,” we shall question the past. In the history of mankind, wars were competitions between societies for resources, wealth, prestige, and domination. The winners took it all, and their way of fighting became the model, the key to success for other societies.

The history shows the importance of geographical (or geopolitical) factors in war.

But equally important were the 'brainpower', the creativity or inventiveness of leading groups or whole societies at a strategic, tactical, or technological level. 
Take, for example, just the Greece-Persian wars, where a league of the city-states with divergent interests but common values fought and defeated the biggest empire of the time. Some of the reasons are still to be discovered, but for sure, the Greeks were valuing the open–spirit, the technology, and the art of war ('strategy' and 'tactics' are Ancient Greek concepts). War has become, from that moment on, a confrontation between the ‘intelligence’ of different cultures (on the pathway of Sung Tzu’s ‘Art of war’).

Particular case studies may hint at this ‘social intelligence’ (or ‘social creativity’) with significant military implications. 

For example, suppose one compares Germany and Great Britain during the Second World War. In that case, one can identify a higher British strategic creativity (including espionage superiority-like Enigma code-breaking, propaganda superiority, ‘soft power’ superiority) while Germany had, at least for a while, superior tactical creativity (the invention of blitzkrieg through learning and extrapolation from the First WW). The technological creativity was apparently equal between the two states.

We can also identify another critical factor: creative management. For example, the naval convoy organization in the Battle of Atlantic resulted from operational research, which was far better in England[2] than in Germany. The same type of case study applied to the US versus Germany in the Second World War may also identify the superior creative management in the US.

The US had equally superior technological creativity (the atomic bomb and the computers are real breakthroughs, much more than any of the ‘marvel weapons’ of Hitler). At a strategic level, the USA were likewise superior to Germany (soft power, strategic bombardments, etc.).

To foresee the future of war, it is crucial to understand the upcoming society's ‘characters’. The social paradigm is already shifting from matter and energy to information. The production of goods and energy will always play a role, but the primary asset will be information retrieval, processing, and, most of all, its creation. 
I firmly believe that we are in the middle of a rapid expansion that will soon (by 2015) establish a first ‘knowledge (or ‘creative’) society’ within the US. Future applications (based on the semantic web, data mining, grid and cloud computing, virtualization, simulations, social network, etc.) will act as creative ‘accelerators’  with a direct impact on military factors identified above.

As a result, several scenarios seem plausible.

In the first scenario, the ‘social (enhanced) creativity’ will change the war's technological ‘environment’. Some classical weaponry will apparently survive by becoming ‘smarter’ and communicating between them or military personnel. 
The real-time inter-connectivity will allow optimization by reducing casualties and destruction. Equally important will be the development of new artifacts: war robots. They will assist and enhance the abilities of human warriors[3]. Well adapted for asymmetric wars (against pre-industrial or industrial societies), they will pursue the same warfare optimization trend.

A more extreme scenario is related to the emergence of ‘ICT weapons’, controlling the enemy's information flow or information systems (industrial or post-industrial societies). 
The Israeli attack on some (assumed) nuclear Syrian facilities in operation Orchard seems to be a step in that direction[4]. Apparently, the Israelis may have used a technology similar to America’s Suter airborne network attack system to allow their planes to pass undetected by Syrians radars. Such a system can identify the enemy’s radars see, then process in real-time the radar’s signals, and feed it back (using high energy antennas) with desired signals (in this case erasing any signature of an upcoming air attack). 
Massive real-time processing power and microwave antennas might neutralize behind the scene without destruction, an essential piece in the enemy's arsenal[5]. Here, we can see another model of a future confrontation between a ‘knowledge (network-oriented) society’ and an industrial one.

This kind of ‘ICT armament’ might be the final precision weapon. There will be almost no casualties; no need to dismantle the cities, they will be 'only shut down'; no necessity for enemy’s armies to be taken out, they will be only neutralized - in each case not for very long. Without causalities and destruction, there is no need for post war reconstruction or nation (re)building. The war, as we know it, dematerialize.

The last scenario, related to the former, concerns the future conflicts between equally developed ‘knowledge societies’[6]. The mains asset is the emergence of “tools,” allowing to guess and eventually control the enemy’s ‘thinking’.

In the Second WW (by 1943), the US political leaders asked prominent psychologists from Harvard University to realize Hitler's ‘profiling‘. They concluded that he will fight to the very end and will finally commit suicide. Therefore, while dealing with a dictatorship, the ‘profiling’ of the leader may give an insight, a sort of ‘profile' for a whole society (because he is the only decider). 
For a democratic country, as any ‘knowledge society’ of today or tomorrow, the situation is different. But the ‘information revolution’ underway might provide an answer.

Google can ‘profile’ all of us, as users, and aggregate our behavior at a social level. Some time ago, for example, Google announced, based on a statistical analysis of researching words, a flu epidemic days before  American health administration. 
In the future, these kinds of instruments might be applied to a military context. The knowledge societies will become ‘transparent’ to themselves and to eventual enemies. No surprises, no hidden attacks will be possible since the new technologies will allow the ‘profiling’ of an army staff or entire army or society. Therefore, each one may compute its chances with a deterrent effect for the two enemies[7]. 
In this situation, the future warfare will become a mega high tech covered operation matching today espionage or propaganda operations.

Let’s hope that future war will change its present nature and render obsolete the suffering, death, and immense destruction we experienced since the beginning of History.

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[1]Occam's razor may be used to ‘cut off’ specific scenarios by understanding the causes for success or failure in past predictions.

[2]One can distinguish four closely connected aspect of ‘social creativity’ with direct impact on war: strategic creativity (real understanding of own strengths, deep 'soft power', innovative policy decision making, profiling and understanding of the enemy, etc.), creative management (efficient, flexible and creative organizations and logistics), tactical creativity (intelligent development of tactics) and technological creativity (the invention of new weapons). To ensure victory, all these factors (or at least most of them) had to be stronger than those of the enemy. All these factors will play a role in shaping future wars.

[3]It will be impossible for some years from now (at least 20 years) to build real android robots. Let's compare the whole Internet network with a human brain (while the brain seems to be much more complicated). We understand the difficulty in building a robot able to act, even at a basic psychological level, like a man.

[4]Israelis realized this airstrike on a target at the Deir Ez-Zor region of Syria on the 6^th of September 2007.

[5]Eventually, this might be a high-tech deception against state-of-the-art Russian air defense system: two radars reckoned to be Tor-M1 launchers that carry a payload of eight missiles, as well as two Pachora-2A systems. The same model may be applied in the future against the strategic command infrastructures of an enemy.

[6]Maybe future relationships between the USA and China will approach such a situation.

[7] Similar to satellite surveillance of the ’Cold War’ era.

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