I have the joy of publishing in the International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique, by Springer, my article about "Philipp Heck’s Interest Jurisprudence, the Case for a Sophisticated Historical Interpretation and a Systematic Critique of Objective Legal Theory".
The paper undertakes a comprehensive analysis of Philipp Heck’s Interessenjurisprudenz (Interest Doctrine) as articulated in his seminal 1914 treatise “Gesetzesauslegung und Interessenjurisprudenz,” widely recognized as a masterpiece of systematic thoroughness in legal methodology. Drawing on Heck’s original arguments and the contemporary endorsement of leading scholars Rüthers, Fischer, and Birk, the article reconstructs and defends his case for a sophisticated form of subjective (historical) interpretation grounded in legislative interest analysis, while mounting a systematic critique of objective legal theory in all its variants.
The article first situates Heck within the German methodological landscape of 1914, dominated by three competing approaches: historical interpretation, objective interpretation, and the discredited conceptual jurisprudence (Begriffsjurisprudenz). It demonstrates how Heck transformed traditional historical interpretation from within, replacing its reliance on legislators’ conceptual associations with a deeper inquiry into the competing interests that causally shaped legislation.
Central is Heck’s distinction between psychological will and normative will—the latter understood as the interest structure that achieved legal expression through democratic deliberation. This reconceptualization overcomes the standard objection that collective legislatures cannot possess a unified will, while preserving fidelity to democratic legitimacy.
The article then presents Heck’s systematic refutation of the five principal arguments advanced by objective theorists—the will argument, the form argument, the trust argument, the legal certainty argument, and the supplementation argument— demonstrating that each rests on conceptual confusions that dissolve under rigorous analysis. It further examines Heck’s critique of four distinct variants of objective interpretation: the Identity Theory, the Jurist’s Perspective, the Layman’s Perspective, and Sociological Interpretation.
Particular attention is devoted to Heck’s devastating critique of Köhler’s Sociological interpretation, which the article identifies as the most radical and dangerous form of objective theory. Through the master-servant analogy, Heck exposes Sociological interpretation as a doctrine without parallel in any human command relationship—one that elevates the twisting of words into a methodological principle, introduces radical subjectivism under the guise of objectivity, undermines democratic legislative authority, and destroys legal certainty.
The article concludes that Heck’s Interessenjurisprudenz remains the most compelling framework for statutory interpretation, positioning the judge as an intelligent assistant who effectuates legislative purposes as circumstances evolve, charting a principled middle path between rigid textualism and unconstrained judicial discretion. The enduring relevance of Heck’s challenge to objective interpretation—still dominant in German constitutional jurisprudence—underscores the urgency of renewed engagement with his work.
Springer Nature allowed me, as author, to share the article at: https://rdcu.be/e6m11
