Saturday, October 15, 2011

Something in French about "La comparaison, technique essentielle du juge européen", my book published at L'Harmattan, Paris

-Pourquoi un tel sujet ?
Cette recherche est l’achèvement d’un intérêt constant aux méthodes interprétatives du juge. .
-Pourquoi on parle d’une technique comparative et non pas d’une méthode (dans le sens de méthode interprétative) comparative ?
Parce que la comparaison est un technique multiforme, contenant une méthode interprétative mais également une procédure d’élaboration d’une source de droit : les principes communs. 
-Qu’est-ce que la comparaison comme technique ?
La comparaison comme technique juridique d’un juge est l’emploi volontaire de la comparaison par lui comme moyen de déterminer la regle juridique applicable au cas concret,  par  un recours aux solutions juridiques appartenant (au moins) à un ordre juridique autre que celle  du juge même.
Donc le recours imposé au juge au droit étranger est hors propos ici. Il s’agit dans ce dernier cas d’un emploi non volontaire de la comparaison. L’application du droit étranger comme résultat d’un renvoi opéré par une règle de droit d’un Etat n'est pas une comparaison comme technique du juge. On peut qualifier ces situations comme comparaison nécessaire car il s’agit d'une application ordonnée par une regle du système juridique du juge et il manque l’élément volontaire (volonté libre) du regard vers le droit étranger qui est la caractéristique d’une technique juridique (interprétative au sens large). 
-Où trouver et comment identifier  les manifestations pertinentes de la comparaison ?
Un premier tri s’imposait, pour délimiter seulement les manifestations de la comparaison comme technique. Si on se limitait aux seuls arrêts où le recours à la comparaison comme technique était visible, la récolte aurait du être trop maigre (quelque dizaines des arrêts sur cinquante ans). Donc il a fallu prendre en compte toutes les arrêts comparatifs et leur ajouter les conclusions comparatives des avocats généraux[1]. Il a résulté ainsi une masse d’approximativement 200 documents (des arrêts avec motivation comparative et/ou  des conclusions des avocats généraux avec motivation comparative).
Dans l’analyse ultérieure d'une première importance étaient les rapports entre l’argumentation comparative du juge et celle des avocats généraux. On a considère ainsi les solutions juridiques fondé sur les conclusions comparatives des avocats généraux et qui sont reprises silencieusement par le juge. 

-La structure de la recherche
On a consacré un premier chapitre à la méthodologie, avec une section concernant la définition et l’orientation de l’analyse et une autre section sur l'’évaluation des documents comparatifs.
Ensuite la recherche etait organisé en deux grands parties : une analyse méthodologique de la comparaison comme technique suivie d’une analyse fonctionnelle.
1. L’analyse méthodologique de la comparaison comme technique
On pouvait considérer la comparaison comme méthode a coté d’autres méthodes traditionnelles du juge comme ils ont fait déjà certains anciens juges à la Cour. Il s’agit d’une approche qui prolonge la vision de Zweigert (fameux comparatiste allemand) qui avait parlé de la comparaison comme méthode universelle d’interprétation. En droit interne cette vision avait été contestée par les auteurs considérant qu’il était mieux essayer d’élargir le canon méthodologique classique pour inclure la comparaison.
‘Mutatis mutandis’ en droit communautaire on devait essayer cette dernière approche. L’analyse devait être poussé  plus loin encore par une véritable déconstruction des méthodologies juridiques du juge.
A.  Le premier titre de la partie
On a adopté cette démarche et consacré un premier titre à l’analyse et à la ‘traduction’ de la comparaison interprétative dans les concepts méthodologiques classiques. 
Partant de la théorie de la réception du droit étranger en droit interne et ensuite en droit international et examinant le dialogue entre la doctrine et la pratique du juge communautaire on est arrivé à déterminer l’émergence d’une comparaison interprétative ‘standard’. Il s’agit d’une recherche comparative multilatérale des significations  nationales pour trouver leur ‘noyau commun‘.
Finalement on a été capables expliciter et ‘traduire’ dans les concepts méthodologiques classiques cette comparaison interprétative ‘standard’ comme interprétation grammaticale objective de concepts indéterminés, occupant une place dans le canon objectif classique (a coté des méthodes systématiques et téléologiques)[4].
Mais cette analyse de la comparaison interprétative a laissé un reste: une masse des arrêts relatifs à la Convention de Bruxelles qui n’entraient pas dans le paradigme mentionné. D’un point de vue superficiel, ici le procédée semblait identique avec la comparaison interprétative ‘standard’ mais, en réalité, le fondement et l’agencement avec les méthodes du canon interprétatif classique etait différent. C’est la raison de l’avoir appelé comparaison interprétative ‘unifiante’ : elle a comme but de donner une interprétation du textes de Droit unifié (en espèce la Convention de Bruxelles ) en accord avec le plus grand nombre possible des conceptions particulières nationales.
B. Le deuxième titre de la partie
-La comparaison normative
Un autre titre de la recherche a été consacré à la comparaison comme technique permettant le développement du droit par le juge à travers les principes communs aux droits nationaux.
On a appelée cette manifestation de la technique comparative  comparaison ‘normative’.
Il s’agit des «principes reconnus par les nations civilisées», une véritable directive adressée au juge international par l’article 39 du Statut de la CPIJ et ensuite CIJ. 
Confrontant les situations  comparatives significatives en droit communautaires avec la théorie et la pratique de principes fondé comparativement en droit international on est arrivé a tracer ‘le portait robot’ de cette manifestation de la comparaison ‘normative’
-Comparaison ‘diversité’
Arrivé a cet point des développements on  a trouvé une autre masse d’arrêtes comparatifs (relatifs a la Convention de Bruxelles et au renvoi préjudiciel) qui n’entrait pas, ni dans le paradigme de la comparaison interprétative ‘standard’ ou ‘unifiante’, ni dans celle de la comparaison ‘normative’.
Il s’agissait de situations où le juge confronté, sur la ligne de frontière entre le droit communautaire (ou para communautaire -comme c’est le cas de la Convention de Bruxelles) et le droit national évaluait la nécessité de laisser les droits nationaux en état (dans leur diversité spécifique) par rapport à l’intérêt d’établir une solution commune (communautaire ou para communautaire).
Lorsque le juge donne raison à l’unité sur la diversité il emploie un raisonnement par effets reconnu comme tel par la littérature méthodologique.
Cette comparaison qu’on a appelle ‘diversité‘ ne représente qu’un infra argument, un infra raisonnement imbriqué dans un raisonnement plus large (à un premier niveau, un raisonnement par effets).  En associant le deux versants, positif et négatif du raisonnement on comprend la rôle joué par le juge et surtout le vrai mécanisme qui est en jeu.
Cette comparaison ‘diversité, comme infra raisonnement, est imbriqué dans un raisonnement se manifestant dans la sphère de développement du droit par le juge. Ainsi la comparaison ‘diversité‘ ne développe pas, par elle-même, le droit. Elle est un sous-ensemble d’un raisonnement (par pesée des intérêts) qui exprime le développement du droit par le juge. C’est le principal raison d’avoir placée cette comparaison ‘diversité‘dans le titre consacré à la comparaison comme technique de développement du droit.  
2. L'analyse fonctionnelle de la comparaison comme technique
Apres avoir fini la caractérisation méthodologique de la technique comparative au service du juge communautaire il fallait bâtir une deuxième partie montrant les accomplissements du juge par cette technique. Le vrai angle d’attaque de cette deuxième partie est basé sur les fonctions accomplies par la comparaison.
-Dans un premier titre on a analysé la comparaison et ses ‘fonctions administratives’.
-Dans un deuxième titre on a examiné le rôle de la comparaison dans l’édification et ‘constitutionnalisation’ de l’ordre juridique communautaire.
Il s’agit, d’un côté, de l’émergence, fondée comparativement, des principes structurants (quasi fédéraux) relatifs aux rapports entre  droit communautaire et droits nationaux. D’un autre côté, il s’agit d’avènement, fondé toujours comparativement, d’une protection du ressortissant communautaire en lui attribuant des véritables droits subjectifs publics et finalement des droits et libertés fondamentaux.
3. Dernière problématique et conclusion de la recherche se focalise sur la justification profonde (essentielle) du recours a la technique comparative corrélée à la nature du juge et de l’ordre juridique communautaire.
On a recherché l’analogie fédérale des formes comparatives déjà mentionées pour constater que les Cours fédérales ne recourent jamais à un instrument semblable (une comparaison comme technique). Autrement dit il n’y a pas des solutions fédérales bâties sur les solutions des Etats fédérés. Il n’y a pas non plus une sorte de comparaison ‘diversité’ dans les rapports entre le droit fédéral et les droits fédérés.
Cette différenciation entre une large pratique comparative du juge européen et l’inexistante pratique ‘comparative’ d'un juge fédéral doit s’expliquer par les aspects distinguant le système communautaire d’un système fédéral.
La Communauté et l’Etat fédéral diffèrent quant à la base juridique de leur existence. La Communauté est fondée sur un traité international tandis que l’Etat fédéral est engendré par une constitution. Et à partir de cet aspect le principal motif invoqué contre l’assimilation de la Communauté à l’Etat fédéral est celui de la «compétence de la com­pétence». Il fallait regarder surtout l’aspect dynamique des compétences. Contrairement à l’autorité centrale de l’État fédéral, la Communauté ne détient pas le pouvoir d’étendre ses compétences d’une manière autonome, c’est-à-dire sans procéder à une révision du traité fondateur.
En somme, si la ‘structure apparente’ peut parfois sembler fédérale, la souveraineté gardée par les Etats membres montre que la structure profonde de la Communauté n’est pas de type fédéral. En effet, malgré les apparences, les Etats restent maîtres de la Communauté.
Face au rôle essentiel des Etats membres le juge communautaire doit être attentif à l’équilibre entre unité et diversité (moins important pour une Cour suprême fédérale) pour avoir l’accord des Etats membre (au moins implicite) face aux décisions qu’il adopte. La Cour est obligé de faire appel à des considérations politiques et donc une véritable pesée d’intérêts entre la Communauté et les Etats est  présente toujours(justifiant ainsi la comparaison ‘diversité’).
L’irréductible souveraineté de type international des Etats et leur position très puissante justifie finalement le recours à la comparaison interprétative ’standard’ et a la comparaison ‘normative’.
Ces rapports fondamentaux entre la Communauté et les Etats qui sont gérés par la Cour nous donnent l’esquisse du lien profond entre la nature (la justification) de la comparaison, la nature du juge communautaire et surtout la nature de l’ordre juridique communautaire. Ainsi la comparaison au-delà d’une technique spécifique du juge est également  un révélateur de la nature profonde des Communautés.





Tuesday, September 27, 2011

Cloud computing as new IT paradigm: examining Nicholas Carr’s ideas


The idea behind cloud computing is the sharing of computing resources across many activities. For example, an operator may build a massive data center with tens of thousands of servers and then sell computing power to interested customers. Customers send their tasks through the internet and retrieve in the same way the results of calculations. At the end of the month, the operator may charge the clients to pay only the computing power they have used. The same thing may exist for data storage by giving access to companies that need the capacities of several thousand terabytes.

The great public became aware of the new technology through the bestselling book of Nicholas Carr, “The Big Switch: Rewiring the World from Edison to Google.” The switch here stays for a button linked to the coming out of electric power. Equally, the switch means a change in a computing paradigm that emulates for knowledge economy the ancient shift to electricity in the industrial world. Hence, the author's main argument is grounded on an analogy between early developments of the electrical grid system and today's application rooted in Internet and cloud computing.

The first part of the book sets the basis of the whole argumentation: an analysis of electric power developments some 100 years ago and its tremendous social outcome.
In the first chapter, “Burden's Wheel lays out,” Carr examines the past position of water power, the precursor to electricity, and then explains what these technologies economically means. Carr underlines the exceptional economic impact of general-purpose technologies – those who are the basis for many other commercial activities.
In the second chapter, “The Inventor and His Clear,” Carr reconstitutes the emergence, development, and electric power adoption. He emphasizes that electric power had a false start with Edison's request for continuous electrical current generators. Edison saw himself as a provider for local (every building) electrical generators and associated services ( maintenance, installation, etc.).
The next chapter, “Digital Millwork,” examines the modern history of computing. Here we see the analogy between old client service computing and old continuous electric power generators of Edison.  However, Tesla's generators of alternative electrical current replaced those of Edison's. The following electrical network (allowed by the alternative current) finally displaced the local continuous electric generators. Carr considers that the Internet will do to computing what the dynamo of Tesla (integrated into a grid) did by transforming local electric plants into huge electric power companies.
In this chapter, Carr complains about actual IT costs as being too big for what it delivers. The answer is the cloud computation that will bring computing power on demand exactly as the electric grid give electric power when and where it was needed.
In chapter 4, “Goodbye, Mr. Gates,” Carr paints the future world - a future of virtual computing where physical location and devices based on software licensing no longer exist (hence undermining Microsoft's core business). The comments here are almost in favor of Google and his business model of services via the Internet.
In chapter 5: “The White City,” the author moves back to a historical discussion of how electricity changed people's lives and societies.

The second part of the book underlines the hopes and the dangers of such a paradigm shift.
Electricity drove many revolutions in the years that followed the end of the XIX century, like transportation, middle-class development, and the new mass culture. Carr considers that the switch from local to cloud computing will also bring seismic shifts in business, technology, and learning and that the change is on the run.
The chapter “World Wide Computer” underlines the rampant possibilities of a programmable internet. This chapter focus on how astonishing it will be a world for individuals with infinite information and computing power available to them. 
Carr discusses equally the future of corporate computing. The basic idea is that today's IT will disappear. Until now, if someone needed computing power, he needed to buy servers and install software on them. On the contrary, cloud computing makes the hardware and software transparent. Computing power becomes a commodity that is used as the electric current that we pay to use. The equipment that generates it becomes invisible to the end-user.
The equipment will become abstract when the infrastructure consists of thousands of servers. More than that,  the failure of one server does not cause any break in service. 
That explains, according to experts, the real reason for Google's superiority over competitors. Google does not necessarily have the best search algorithms but has separate intelligent infrastructure software that gives him a tremendous competitive advantage. Many smaller companies will have access to the tools once reserved for enormous undertakings. Productivity and creativity will, therefore, increase.
Cloud computing is a step closer to post-industrial society because a client will not buy servers anymore from a manufacturer but will buy a service. 
Manufacturers like Dell, HP, or IBM will, therefore, be faced with clients that will buy servers by thousands and have enormous bargaining power. A price war will then engage, and computing power will become incredibly cheap and accessible.
Tens of thousands of IT jobs on maintenance will be destroyed. But the software development market will expand. Equally, the application software that can use this unexpected power will explode. The software will move to the SaaS model (Software as a Service), where the software will be installed on cloud computing and used through the Internet. This transition is already underway (via software such as SalesForce.com and many other software packages) but will accelerate.
The chapter “From Many to the Few” discusses the social impacts of a programmable Internet. Carr systematically unveils here the negative consequences. Fewer and fewer people will need to work in a global world of the programmable Internet, but the utopia of equality and the web's local industries will never arrive. The author also underlines the erosion of the middle class.
The chapter “The Great Unbundling” describes the move from mass markets to markets of niches. The section also debates the social implications of the web to create a tribal and increasingly sliced world rather than a unified one. The Internet is strengthening the user's ideas because it allows him to find only others with the same goals. The World Wide Web is increasingly become a zone of niches and not a universal space assumed to arise with the Internet.
In the chapter “Fighting the Net,” Carr discusses the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the free-flowing of information and the net's structural integrity.
In “A Spider's Web,” he addresses the personal privacy issues associated with the web and the realization that "we live in a world without secrets." This chapter is equally a warning about what it means to do business where everything is recorded and tracked: "Computer systems are not, at their core, technologies of emancipation. They are technologies of control." He points out that even a decentralized cloud network can be programmed to monitor and control.
The last chapter, “iGod,” discusses a futuristic vision of fusion between men and machines.  What would be possible when the human brain can immediately access infinite information, and the tools gain Artificial Intelligence (apparently this is Google’s program)?
These are the questions raised but unanswered in the chapter. As a matter of fact, the book ends by saying that we will not know where IT is going until our children, the first generation to be “wired” from the beginning, become adults.

General evaluation of the book
The main argument is that desktop software will be displaced by Web 2.0 (peer to per and participative internet) and cloud computing. When electricity began its development, many businesses used local sources for power, including local waterwheel or windmill on their own property. As the electrical grid developed, companies were able to get fuel delivered from somewhere else. They didn't know or really care, as long as it came in. 
In the computer industry, the same transition is going on. Instead of using programs on your PC, more and more businesses are using Web 2.0 technology to host their critical mission software somewhere else, and they don't really know where or even care. The advantages of such a transition would be at least economical, and the author cites one source as saying that Google’s computation (probably the largest user of cloud computing through its distributed data centers) can do a task at one-tenth of the cost.
If some aspects are never mentioned (for example, the copyright topics), the author did not fall either in a triumphalist or utopian vision. Some of his conclusions underline the shortcoming of the new paradigm: a further decline in print publishing, a reduction in the middle class, and the continuing erosion of privacy.
But can his core analogy with the electric grid be maintained? The electrical power system is a highly regulated market system (from a strategic perspective, this is quite normal). Can the knowledge economy and the new paradigm of cloud computing be envisioned in the same way? This is a fascinating point which the author never addresses. 
How to understand the actual trend of decentralized electric power generators (for example, by solar panels alimenting electrically autonomous houses)? These new tendencies may affect the pertinence of a similar paradigm shift linked to cloud computing.
The issue of privacy can also undermine all the intellectual build up. Inevitably the high computation power plants of the future will control the data of their clients. And these privacy intrusions might concern not just lay individuals (that may eventually accommodate with it) but the economic data, business plans, commercial secrets, secret inventions, or know-how of different undertakings. 
Is it possible to give all those highly sensitive information to a giant and an almost unique player like Google? Can we trade efficiency with the lack of independence? The answer seems to be negative. But these issues are likely to incite a debate of challenges and possible technical or juridical remedies. The future will decide on the balance between efficiency and privacy, independence, and monopolistic control.
However, one can reasonably agree with the author that ‘cloud computing’ and the pervasive network will be essential in shaping the future landscape of our knowledge economy and society.

Future of wars, wars of the future...

Predicting the future of war is a challenging but fascinating endeavor. 
The pop culture we are now submerged in has familiarized us with the images of a nutty–gritty mix of weapons, robots, hi-tech knights in a sort of a mega computer game. Shall the war of tomorrow be a purely technological competition in advanced weaponry? My belief is that this colorful image is just a part of the answer.
To foresee the future war as in a “crystal ball,” we shall question the past. In the history of mankind, wars were competitions between societies for resources, wealth, prestige, and domination. The winners took it all, and their way of fighting became the model, the key to success for other societies.

The history shows the importance of geographical (or geopolitical) factors in war.
But equally important were the 'brainpower', the creativity or inventiveness of leading groups or whole societies at a strategic, tactical, or technological level. 
Take, for example, just the Greece-Persian wars, where a league of the city-states with divergent interests but common values fought and defeated the biggest empire of the time. Some of the reasons are still to be discovered, but for sure, the Greeks were valuing the open–spirit, the technology, and the art of war ('strategy' and 'tactics' are Ancient Greek concepts). War has become, from that moment on, a confrontation between the ‘intelligence’ of different cultures (on the pathway of Sung Tzu’s ‘Art of war’).
Particular case studies may hint at this ‘social intelligence’ (or ‘social creativity’) with significant military implications. 

For example, suppose one compares Germany and Great Britain during the Second World War. In that case, one can identify a higher British strategic creativity (including espionage superiority-like Enigma code-breaking, propaganda superiority, ‘soft power’ superiority) while Germany had, at least for a while, superior tactical creativity (the invention of blitzkrieg through learning and extrapolation from the First WW). The technological creativity was apparently equal between the two states.
We can also identify another critical factor: creative management. For example, the naval convoy organization in the Battle of Atlantic resulted from operational research, which was far better in England[2] than in Germany. The same type of case study applied to the US versus Germany in the Second World War may also identify the superior creative management in the US.
The US had equally superior technological creativity (the atomic bomb and the computers are real breakthroughs, much more than any of the ‘marvel weapons’ of Hitler). At a strategic level, the USA were likewise superior to Germany (soft power, strategic bombardments, etc.).

To foresee the future of war, it is crucial to understand the upcoming society's ‘characters’. The social paradigm is already shifting from matter and energy to information. The production of goods and energy will always play a role, but the primary asset will be information retrieval, processing, and, most of all, its creation. 
I firmly believe that we are in the middle of a rapid expansion that will soon (by 2015) establish a first ‘knowledge (or ‘creative’) society’ within the US. Future applications (based on the semantic web, data mining, grid and cloud computing, virtualization, simulations, social network, etc.) will act as creative ‘accelerators’  with a direct impact on military factors identified above.
As a result, several scenarios seem plausible.

In the first scenario, the ‘social (enhanced) creativity’ will change the war's technological ‘environment’. Some classical weaponry will apparently survive by becoming ‘smarter’ and communicating between them or military personnel. 
The real-time inter-connectivity will allow optimization by reducing casualties and destruction. Equally important will be the development of new artifacts: war robots. They will assist and enhance the abilities of human warriors[3]. Well adapted for asymmetric wars (against pre-industrial or industrial societies), they will pursue the same warfare optimization trend.

A more extreme scenario is related to the emergence of ‘ICT weapons’, controlling the enemy's information flow or information systems (industrial or post-industrial societies). 
The Israeli attack on some (assumed) nuclear Syrian facilities in operation Orchard seems to be a step in that direction[4]. Apparently, the Israelis may have used a technology similar to America’s Suter airborne network attack system to allow their planes to pass undetected by Syrians radars. Such a system can identify the enemy’s radars see, then process in real-time the radar’s signals, and feed it back (using high energy antennas) with desired signals (in this case erasing any signature of an upcoming air attack). 
Massive real-time processing power and microwave antennas might neutralize behind the scene without destruction, an essential piece in the enemy's arsenal[5]. Here, we can see another model of a future confrontation between a ‘knowledge (network-oriented) society’ and an industrial one.
This kind of ‘ICT armament’ might be the final precision weapon. There will be almost no casualties; no need to dismantle the cities, they will be 'only shut down'; no necessity for enemy’s armies to be taken out, they will be only neutralized - in each case not for very long. Without causalities and destruction, there is no need for post war reconstruction or nation (re)building. The war, as we know it, dematerialize.

The last scenario, related to the former, concerns the future conflicts between equally developed ‘knowledge societies’[6]. The mains asset is the emergence of “tools,” allowing to guess and eventually control the enemy’s ‘thinking’.
In the Second WW (by 1943), the US political leaders asked prominent psychologists from Harvard University to realize Hitler's ‘profiling‘. They concluded that he will fight to the very end and will finally commit suicide. Therefore, while dealing with a dictatorship, the ‘profiling’ of the leader may give an insight, a sort of ‘profile' for a whole society (because he is the only decider). 
For a democratic country, as any ‘knowledge society’ of today or tomorrow, the situation is different. But the ‘information revolution’ underway might provide an answer.
Google can ‘profile’ all of us, as users, and aggregate our behavior at a social level. Some time ago, for example, Google announced, based on a statistical analysis of researching words, a flu epidemic days before  American health administration. 
In the future, these kinds of instruments might be applied to a military context. The knowledge societies will become ‘transparent’ to themselves and to eventual enemies. No surprises, no hidden attacks will be possible since the new technologies will allow the ‘profiling’ of an army staff or entire army or society. Therefore, each one may compute its chances with a deterrent effect for the two enemies[7]
In this situation, the future warfare will become a mega high tech covered operation matching today espionage or propaganda operations.

Let’s hope that future war will change its present nature and render obsolete the suffering, death, and immense destruction we experienced since the beginning of History.




[1]Occam's razor may be used to ‘cut off’ specific scenarios by understanding the causes for success or failure in past predictions.
[2]One can distinguish four closely connected aspect of ‘social creativity’ with direct impact on war: strategic creativity (real understanding of own strengths, deep 'soft power', innovative policy decision making, profiling and understanding of the enemy, etc.), creative management (efficient, flexible and creative organizations and logistics), tactical creativity (intelligent development of tactics) and technological creativity (the invention of new weapons). To ensure victory, all these factors (or at least most of them) had to be stronger than those of the enemy. All these factors will play a role in shaping future wars.
[3]It will be impossible for some years from now (at least 20 years) to build real android robots. Let's compare the whole Internet network with a human brain (while the brain seems to be much more complicated). We understand the difficulty in building a robot able to act, even at a basic psychological level, like a man.
[4]Israelis realized this airstrike on a target at the Deir Ez-Zor region of Syria on the 6th of September 2007.
[5]Eventually, this might be a high-tech deception against state-of-the-art Russian air defense system: two radars reckoned to be Tor-M1 launchers that carry a payload of eight missiles, as well as two Pachora-2A systems. The same model may be applied in the future against the strategic command infrastructures of an enemy.
[6]Maybe future relationships between the USA and China will approach such a situation.
[7] Similar to satellite surveillance of the ’Cold War’ era.