When Interessenjurisprudenz distanced itself from a decision of the Supreme Court (answering the catastrophe of Weimar's Germany hyperinflation )

 In November 1923, Germany's Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) faced an impossible choice. The nation's hyperinflation had just ended, but it left behind a legal catastrophe. Emergency laws passed in 1914 to finance World War I by borrowing had established a "forced exchange rate" requiring creditors to accept paper marks at face value, regardless of devaluation. Between 1914 and 1923, the German mark collapsed from a stable currency to worthless paper, with 4.2 trillion marks per US dollar by the end. A loaf of bread cost 160 marks in late 1922 but 200 billion marks a year later. The middle class was destroyed.  Creditors who had lent in good faith faced total ruin.

On November 28, 1923, the Reichsgericht ruled that mortgage creditors were entitled to "revaluation"—payment calculated in gold mark values rather than worthless paper. The Court based its decision on Article 242 of the German Civil Code, which requires good faith (Treu und Glauben). The Court argued that, correctly interpreted, the 1914 monetary laws never intended such extreme consequences and that good-faith principles prevented debtors from exploiting devaluation to evade absolute obligations.

Philipp Heck, founder of the doctrine of interests (Interessenjurisprudenz), offered his own variant of a decision after a devastating critique. While acknowledging revaluation as "an ethical imperative," Heck argued the Court's decision rested on erroneous historical interpretation, misapplied good faith principles, and exceeded judicial authority. 

This controversy raised fundamental questions about legal method still relevant today: Can courts use general principles to override clear legislative commands? Should changed circumstances trigger judicial reinterpretation or require legislative reform? What are the limits of judicial power during crises?

Based on a presentation I gave at a Conference held on 24-25 October in Craiova, Romania, I developed a paper that addresses all the above problems. The English variant of the paper is under the title: "The German Supreme Court Confronts Catastrophe and the Limits of Judicial Power: Analyzing the 1923 Reichsgericht Revaluation Decision, the Doctrinal Arguments, and Philipp Heck's Critique". The paper is visible at:https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5907123

Legal reasoning and argument, my new book about methods of interpretation in Germany

The above book, a first in English, comprehensively explores German legal methods of the courts. Since the legal methodology is the theory of practice, the book focused on cases (sometimes historical ones) and analyzed them from a methodological perspective.

Given the extraordinary richness of German methodological doctrine, choosing this country as the main focus was straightforward. The selected bibliography mentions the principal authors consulted. Professor Eberhard Dordorf's work is one of the most remarkable endeavors in this field. Since he was inspired by Koch and Rüßmann, a presentation of these authors is also a straightforward choice. The treaties of Larenz or Zippelius, in addition to the ones of Pawlowski, Rüthers, or Engisch, are methodological goldmines followed throughout the volume.

The book is divided into seven main sections, serving as a clear roadmap for readers. 

It begins by explaining the fundamental process of applying legal norms, including their structure, how they are expanded and applied to specific cases, and the concept of subsumption, which involves fitting a particular case under a general legal rule. It then introduces the judicial syllogism as a critical tool in legal reasoning.

The second section delves into the history of legal interpretation in Germany, tracing the evolution of different schools of thought from Savigny's canon of interpretation methods through various movements such as conceptual jurisprudence (Begriffsjurisprudenz), the School of Objective Interpretation, and the Free Law School, culminating in the doctrine of interests (Interessenjurisprudenz).

The third part explores the debate between subjective and objective interpretation systems, presenting arguments for both sides. It also proposes a potential reconciliation of the two approaches, suggesting that a balanced approach that considers both the lawgiver's subjective intentions and the law's objective meaning could be the most effective.

The following sections (IV, V, and VII) break down specific methods of interpretation: literal, subjective, and objective. Each is explored in detail, discussing its aims, structures, and applications in legal practice. The book provides examples and case studies to illustrate these concepts.

Section VI focuses on the development of law, distinguishing between interpretation and development, and exploring the concept of gaps in the law. It presents various arguments and techniques for developing law and filling legal gaps, including analogies, restrictive interpretation, and teleological reduction. The book's practical approach, rich in examples, case studies, and annexes, is designed to equip readers with tools to apply the theoretical concepts in real-world legal scenarios, fostering a deep and confident understanding of the topic.

At this moment, the book can be bought through an online order at  https://editura.uvt.ro/product/legal-reasoning-and-argument-a-handbook/ or at https://www.librarie.net/p/479679/legal-reasoning-and-argument-a-handbook?srsltid=AfmBOooUGbGyLXhz07aY5OJ_OiTCMl7Oy-TzbZWoUaEhQevyYHSRIVe7